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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a version of the Holmstr¨ om-Milgrom linear model with two
tasks, production and administration, where performance is harder to measure in the
latter. Both the principal and agent can devote eﬀort to these tasks. We assume there are
gains from specialization and that players have a preference for solidarity in work. As the
gains from specialization increase, the principal eventually prefers to hire the agent solely
for production purposes over autarky. As these gains increase still further, the principal
increasingly specializes in administration and in the limit there is a complete division of
labor. At the same time, the nature of the employment contract is transformed from
one based on solidarity to one based on incentives. We therefore formalize aspects of the
thought of Smith and Marx, who held that a division of labor leads to exchange and a
deterioration in social relations.
Keywords: alienation, cooperation, division of labor, incentives, Marxism, reciprocity,
and solidarity.
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In his wide-ranging survey, Bowles (1998) discusses a substantial body of experimental and
ﬁeld evidence from a variety of disciplines which indicates that markets and other economic
institutions can aﬀect people’s preferences. E.g., Mallon (1983) documents the erosion of
solidarity and community institutions for the provision of public goods when markets were
extended to the central highlands of Peru during the early twentieth century. Likewise,
Alesina and Fuchs-Sch¨ undeln (2006) report statistical evidence from panel data which
suggests that former East Germans raised under communism have stronger preferences for
redistribution and state intervention than West Germans, even after controlling for their
economic interests.
In his survey and subsequent theoretical work, Sobel (2005, 2007) asks the question
more directly: “do markets make people selﬁsh?” In Sobel (2007) he develops a general
class of interdependent preferences and shows that reciprocal agents are generally unable
to aﬀect the equilibrium in market-like settings and will therefore appear selﬁsh. This is
because agents have little inﬂuence over prices in such settings and it is diﬃcult to punish
someone on the other side of the market when there are other agents on one’s own side
who are willing to transact at the terms on oﬀer. In essence, these results extend those by
Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), and Falk and Fischbacher (2006).
Sobel’s point is that people’s preferences can only be elicited to the extent that the speciﬁc
environment allows.
In this paper, we consider a version of the Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991) linear
agency model with two tasks, “administration” and “production,” where performance
is harder to measure in the former. In contrast with the existing literature, both the
principal (she) and agent (he) can devote eﬀort towards these tasks.1 As in Sobel (2007),
the player’s preferences are interdependent and in our model express a preference for
solidarity: the principal and agent prefer matching eﬀorts in both tasks, ceteris paribus.
Since the principal can commit to a contract that states her own eﬀorts in each task, as
1 An exception is the literature on double moral hazard [e.g., see Kim and Wang (1998) and their
references], where the principal and agent work together on a single task and the principal’s eﬀort is also
subject to moral hazard. In this paper, we assume the principal can commit to her own eﬀort levels as
part of the contract in order to study the eﬀects of solidarity.
1well as incentives for each, these preferences can be interpreted in terms of an endogenous
norm established by the principal as part of the contract.
Like Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, p. 36), we distinguish two extreme and polar
institutions: the ﬁrst involves zero incentives, so the players’ eﬀorts are motivated entirely
by solidarity, and the second is supported by high-powered incentives alone. We call the
former the solidarity equilibrium (similar to the “employment” contract in Holmstr¨ om and
Milgrom) and the latter the market equilibrium (similar to their “contracting” institution),
although there is a continuum of possibilities in between. In this paper, we ask: under
what conditions does the optimal contract reﬂect solidarity, and under what conditions
does it reﬂect a market arrangement? This question is quite similar to Sobel’s, except that
now the institution is endogenous. In other words, Sobel’s question can be rephrased as:
how do reciprocal players aﬀect the equilibrium in diﬀerent institutions, whereas here we
ask the complementary question: what institutions do reciprocal players choose?
In this paper, we explore an answer that dates back to Adam Smith and Karl Marx. In
the Wealth of Nations, Smith explains how markets and the division of labor are mutually
reinforcing: a division of labor leads to exchange because the producer can no longer subsist
on her own specialized product, while the division of labor is limited by the extent of the
market. Although Smith extolled the virtues of specialization, he also thought it deprived
workers of their “intellectual, social, and martial virtues,” an admission that paved the way
for Marx’s conception of alienation in capitalism [see Blaug (1997, p. 35)]. Although most
economists are familiar with the main outlines of Capital (e.g., the labor theory of value,
the falling rate of proﬁt, etc.), the theory of alienation developed in his early writings seems
less well-known. A major theme, described brieﬂy in the next section, is that the division
of labor leads to market exchange and a subsequent deterioration in social relations.
Marx’s ideas on alienation have had a lasting inﬂuence on the broader social sciences
outside economics, as well as popular discussions on globalization and capitalism.2 E.g.,
Thomas L. Friedman expresses the main theme of his bestseller The Lexus and the Olive
2 Although he does not blame capitalism, Putnam’s Bowling Alone (2000) [also see the review by Sobel
(2002)], attempts to document the depreciation in social capital in the US over the past 30 years or so,
in the sense of a signiﬁcant decline in group activities such as bowling leagues, voting, clubs, organized
religion, etc. The theoretical literature on social capital in economics includes Mailath and Postlewaite
(2003, 2006).
2Tree (2000, p. 34) as follows:
And what we are looking at and for is how the age-old quests for material betterment and for
individual and community identity — which go all the way back to Genesis — play themselves
out in today’s dominant international system of globalization. This is the drama of the Lexus
and the olive tree.
Likewise, Sylvia Ostroy (2001, p. 11-2) has remarked that
One is struck in reading on the subject of anti-globalization how often two words appear —
alienation and anomie. The ﬁrst is from Marx and is essentially a moral critique of capitalism. He
argued that because labor becomes a commodity, the worker loses all power to control the processes
by which decisions are made that aﬀect his life. Anomie, ﬁrst used by the French sociologist Emile
Durkheim writing at the beginning of the twentieth century, stressed the individual’s sense of
powerlessness and the loss of social cohesion... I think alienation and anomie are useful concepts
to explain the rise of the anti-globalization movement.
To formalize these ideas, we assume that production exhibits gains from specialization,
so output is greater when the players specialize in separate tasks. As these gains increase,
the principal eventually prefers to hire the agent over autarky. Since the agent is risk
averse and administration is harder to measure, she hires him solely for production work.
As the gains from specialization increase still further, the principal re-allocates her eﬀort
out of production and into administration. At the same time, she increases the agent’s
incentives, whose motivation has been weakened by the loss of solidarity. An increase in the
gains from specialization leads to the division of labor, exchange (market relations), and a
deterioration in social relations. In the limit, we obtain the market equilibrium where both
players completely specialize and the agent is motivated solely by incentives. A suﬃcient
condition for these results is that the players’ preferences for solidarity must be suﬃciently
weak: selﬁsh players choose to transact in markets. We also sketch a mechanism that can
achieve the solidarity equilibrium which formalizes certain utopian aspects of Marx’s views
on the transition from capitalism to communism.
Solidarity preferences are similar to standard reciprocal preferences in that an increase
(decrease) in eﬀort by the principal motivates the agent to increase (decrease) his own
eﬀort in the same task. The experimental literature on reciprocity in agency settings is
surveyed in Fehr and G¨ achter (2000) and Fehr and Fischbacher (2002). This literature is
important for our purposes because (i) it establishes that reciprocity is a major feature
3of agency relationships; (ii) Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2001, 2007) report that subjects
acting as principals chose implicit contracts based on reciprocity (similar to our solidarity
equilibrium) over incentive contracts 88% of the time; and (iii) Fehr and G¨ achter (2001)
show that incentives can “crowd out” reciprocity, which is broadly consistent with our
comparative statics results with respect to the gains from specialization.
The papers closest to ours in the literature on specialization are Lindbeck and Snower
(1996, 2000), who consider two tasks, 1 and 2, that are complementary in production and
two types of workers, where type 1 (2) workers have a comparative advantage in task 1 (2).
After paying the workers’ reservation wages, the ﬁrm allocates them between the two tasks.
This allocation is determined by three main forces: (i) the gains from specialization, (ii)
“informational task complementarities” (the more time a worker spends on one task, the
better he does the other), and (iii) workers’ preferences with respect to specialization. The
authors show that a complete division of labor results when the gains from specialization
increase suﬃciently fast relative to the gains from informational task complementarities
and workers have a suﬃciently strong preference for specialized work.3
Rob and Zemsky (2002) consider a dynamic version of the linear agency model with
a continuum of risk neutral agents. In each period, agents allocate eﬀort between an
individual and a cooperative task, where the latter is more proﬁtable but the former is more
easily observed by the principal. Their contributions to the cooperative task are driven by
reciprocity, so an increase in incentives today leads to less cooperation today and therefore
less cooperation tomorrow. The model can have two long-run steady-state equilibria: a
“good” equilibrium with high cooperation, high proﬁts, and low incentives, and a “bad”
equilibrium. If the initial level of cooperation is low, the bad equilibrium results. As
this initial condition increases, however, eventually the good equilibrium obtains. There
is therefore a negative relationship between incentives and cooperation, whereas in our
model this is driven by the gains from specialization.
The plan for the rest of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we brieﬂy describe Marx’s
theory of alienation. In section 3, we present the model and results. Section 4 concludes.
3 Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, section 5.1) and Itoh (1991) also consider cooperation in agency
relationships, without gains from specialization or social preferences. This “cooperation” is really joint
production enforced by incentives, and not cooperation in a truly cooperative sense.
42. Alienation and the Division of Labor
In this section, we discuss those aspects of Marx’s theory of alienation that are centered on
the division of labor.4 For more complete discussions, see Elster (1985, 1986), Kolakowski
(2005), and Ollman (1976). For analytical treatments of other aspects of Marx’s thought,
see Roemer (1981, 1982). Before proceeding, we repeat Archibald’s (1992, p. 61) remark
that Marx’s conception of alienation “in no way depends on the labor theory of value,
which is simply irrelevant.”
First of all, Marx takes the individual’s objective to be self-realization rather than
utility maximization [for a comparison, see Elster (1986, Chapter 3)]. In other words, the
individual seeks to develop her potential and to manifest her abilities in society. In Marx’s
view, one can only achieve self-fulﬁllment in society.5
The human being is in the most literal sense a zoon politikon [a political animal], not merely
a gregarious animal, but an animal which can individuate himself only in the midst of society.
Production by an isolated individual outside society – a rare exception which may well occur when
a civilized person in whom the social forces are already dynamically present is cast by accident into
the wilderness – is as much of an absurdity as is the development of language without individuals
living together and talking to each other... The point could go entirely unmentioned if this twaddle,
which had sense and reason for the eighteenth-century characters had not been earnestly pulled
back into the center of the most modern economics by Bastiat, Carey, Proudhon, etc.
Marx, the Grundrisse, p. 223.
For Marx, the most important arena for self-realization is joint production with others.
Its implications extend beyond material sustenance, because it also deﬁnes a way of life.
This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the
physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a deﬁnite form of activity of the individuals, a
deﬁnite form of expressing their life, a deﬁnite mode of life on their part. As individuals express
their lives, so they are. What they are, therefore, coincides with their production, both with what
they produce and with how they produce.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 150.
4 The worker’s alienation is traditionally divided into alienation from his product (issues stemming from
the fact that the product belongs to the capitalist and not to him), his activity, man-from-man alienation,
and species alienation. In this paper, we neglect alienation from the product because, as Elster (1986, p. 49)
points out, modern production methods make it diﬃcult for a worker to identify any product as exclusively
his and mass market production breaks the personal bond between consumer and producer. As in this
paper, Elster goes on to argue that joint production oﬀers the most plausible vehicle for self-realization in
modern economic life.
5 All citations of Marx and Engels refer to page numbers in Tucker (1978). In Capital (p. 324), Marx
writes: “Since Robinson Crusoe’s experiences are a favorite theme with political economists, let us take a
look at him on his island.”
5To complete his view of human nature, Marx had an exaggerated sense of the relationship
between humanity and the external world, or nature. In an ideal state (i.e., communism),
the human race will work together to transform the external world and will see it as the
work of its own hands. At the same time, people are also a product of nature, which
includes other people. According to Marx, idealized humanity can only be understood in
terms of this mutual interaction, which he calls the “life of the species.”
It is an anthropocentric viewpoint, seeing in humanized nature a counterpart of practical
human intentions; as human practice has a social character, its cognitive eﬀect – the image of
nature – is the work of social man. Human consciousness is merely the expression in thought of
a social relationship to nature, and must be considered as a product of the collective eﬀort of the
species.
Kolakowski (2005, p. 114).
We now come to the division of labor. Although Smith was emphatically positive
overall, his negative remarks formed the starting-point for Marx’s later views.
The man whose life is spent in performing a few simple operations, of which the eﬀects too are,
perhaps, always the same, or very nearly the same, has no occasion to exert his understanding,
or to exercise his invention in ﬁnding out expedients for removing diﬃculties which never occur.
He naturally loses, therefore, the habit of such exertion, and generally becomes as stupid and
ignorant as it is possible for a human creature to become. The torpor of his mind renders him,
not only incapable of relishing or bearing a part in any rational conversation, but of conceiving any
generous, noble, or tender sentiment, and consequently of forming any just judgment concerning
many even of the ordinary duties of private life.
Smith, Wealth of Nations, quoted in Archibald (1992, p. 64).
Marx agrees with Smith that a division of labor leads to exchange.6
In The German Ideology the root of all evil is the division of labor, private property being
once again a secondary phenomenon... Marx’s view is that the division of labor... is the ﬁrst
source of the alienating process and, through it, of private property. This happens because the
division of labor leads necessarily to commerce, i.e. the transformation of objects produced by man
into vehicles of abstract exchange-value. When things become commodities, the basic premise of
alienation already exists.
Kolakowski (2005, p. 141).
6 This is an instance of Marx’s historical materialism, which states that the productive forces (e.g.,
technology, human capital, etc.) determine everything else, including property relations, the legal and
political framework, and intellectual endeavors such as philosophy. In contrast, in Marx’s historical analysis
of the transition from feudalism to capitalism (as opposed to his theoretical statements), he also emphasized
other factors such as the discovery of the new world [see Elster (1986, Chapter 6)].
6The rise of markets results in a deterioration of social relations, where people perceive
each other only as owners of their respective commodities.
The bourgeoisie... has left no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest,
than callous “cash payment.” It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervor, of
chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. It
has resolved personal worth into exchange value...
Marx and Engels, The Communist Manifesto, p. 476.
As Elster (1986, p. 53) puts it, “markets operate by arm’s-length transactions that subvert
communitarian values.”
In comparison with communism, the “life of the species” (labor) becomes only a way
to make money. The social bond established by cooperative production no longer exists,
and with the division of labor each individual has his or her own separate sphere. Since
communal self-actualization is what separates human beings from the animals, work in
capitalism becomes “individual animalized life.”
Labor, which is the life of the species, becomes only a means to individual animalized life,
and the social essence of man becomes a mere instrument of individual existence. Alienated labor
deprives man of his species-life; other human beings become alien to him, communal existence is
impossible, and life is merely a system of conﬂicting egoisms.
Kolakowski (2005, p. 115)
The capitalist is also alienated. In particular, the principal views the agent simply as a
factor of production, while the agent perceives the principal merely as a source of income.
The reiﬁcation (as it would be called later) of the worker – the fact that his personal qualities
of muscle and brain, his abilities and aspirations, are turned into a “thing,” an object to be bought
and sold on the market – does not mean that the possessor of that “thing” is himself able to enjoy
a free and human existence. On the contrary, the process has its eﬀect on the capitalist, too,
depriving him of personality in a diﬀerent way. As the worker is reduced to an animal condition,
the capitalist is reduced to an abstract money-power: he becomes a personiﬁcation of this power,
and his human qualities are transformed into aspects of it.
(ibid., p. 115)
Marx was fond of pointing out aspects of capitalist society that conformed to the
prisoner’s dilemma (although obviously he did not use that terminology). Elster (1986)
discusses several examples. E.g., although it is individually rational for each capitalist to
7eﬀect a division of labor (indeed, competition compels it), the result is a society that no
one wants.
the division of labor oﬀers us the ﬁrst example of how... as long as a cleavage exists between
the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily but
naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him
instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the distribution of labor comes into being,
each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which
he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a ﬁsherman, a shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain
so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood... this consolidation of what we ourselves
produce into an objective power above us, growing out of our control... is one of the chief factors
of historical development up till now.
Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 160.
Elsewhere, he makes an analogy between capitalist society and the sorcerer’s apprentice in
Goethe’s poem, who called up magical forces that he could not control [Kolakowski (2005,
p. 131)]. True freedom is essentially a coordinated decision to cooperate in the prisoner’s
dilemma.
The aggregate outcome of individual actions appears as an independent and even hostile
power, not as freely and jointly willed... Only by coordinating their choices according to a common
plan can people achieve freedom with respect not only to action but the consequences of action.
Otherwise, they are condemned in perpetuity to playing the sorcerer’s apprentice.
Elster (1986, p. 49, 52-3)
The continuing inﬂuence of these ideas in the social sciences is poignantly illustrated
by Jon Elster’s (1986, p. 4) autobiographical statement that
If, by a Marxist, you mean someone who holds all the beliefs that Marx himself thought
were his most important ideas, including scientiﬁc socialism, the labor theory of value, the theory
of the falling rate of proﬁt, the unity of theory and practice in revolutionary struggle, and the
utopian vision of a transparent communist society unconstrained by scarcity, then I am certainly
not a Marxist. But if, by a Marxist, you mean someone who can trace the ancestry of his most
important beliefs back to Marx, then I am indeed a Marxist. For me this includes, notably, the
dialectical method and the theory of alienation, exploitation, and class struggle, in a suitably
revised and generalized form.
In his list (ibid., Chapter 10) of what is living and what is dead in Marx’s thought, Elster
lists the theory of alienation among the living.
3. Model and Results
The model is a version of the linear model in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991). There
are two tasks, “production” and “administration,” although the only formal distinction
8between them is that performance is harder to measure in the latter. Let eA and aA
denote the agent’s production and administration eﬀorts, respectively, and similarly for
eP and aP corresponding to the principal. The degree of specialization of player i = A,P
is given by |ei − ai|. Let G(eA − aA,eP − aP) represent the gains from specialization.
Throughout the paper, subscripts refer to partial derivatives.
Assumptions 1. (i) G(0,0) = 0, (ii) G1 < 0 when eA < aA, G1 > 0 when eA > aA,
and G1 = 0 when eA = aA. A similar statement applies to G2. (iii) G11,G22 > 0 and
the players’ degrees of specialization are complements for G. (iv) G is symmetric in each
argument:
G(x,y) = G(−x,y) = G(x,−y) (1)
for all x and y.
There are no gains from specialization if neither player specializes. Otherwise, (ii) and
(iii) state that G is increasing at an increasing rate, which encourages full specialization.
Furthermore, an increase in specialization by one player increases the marginal beneﬁt to
specialization for the other. E.g., if eA > aA and aP > eP then G12 < 0. For simplicity,
(iv) states that G is symmetric in the sense that what matters is a player’s degree of
specialization and not the speciﬁc task the player is specializing in. Note that we do not
assume symmetry across players in the form of G(x,y) = G(y,x) for all x and y.
We normalize the price of output to be one, so the principal’s revenue and output are
given by
P(eA + eP,aA + aP) + γG(eA − aA,eP − aP), (2)
where P is a standard production function that depends on total administration and
production eﬀort and γ parameterizes the magnitude of the gains from specialization. The
following assumptions are standard.
Assumptions 2. (i) P(0,0) = 0, (ii) P1,P2,P12 > 0, (iii) P2(·,0) = ∞, and (iv)
P11,P22 < 0.
Note that administration and production eﬀorts are complementary since P12 > 0 and
optimality requires non-zero administration.
9The agent’s eﬀorts in the two tasks generate signals
xe = eA + e
xa = aA + a, (3)
observed by the principal, where e is normally distributed with mean zero and variance Ve
and similarly for a. We also assume e and a are independent. We take production to be
a somewhat mechanical activity, whereas administration involves creativity and leadership
and is therefore harder to measure in the sense that Va > Ve.
For simplicity, we assume all eﬀorts are uniformly bounded from above7
0 ≤ ei,ai ≤ E. (4)
Let Ci(ei + ai) be player i’s disutility of eﬀort, where Ci(0) = 0 and C0
i,C00
i > 0. As in
Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, p. 33) we assume C0
i(0) > 0, which will have important
implications for the principal’s choice between employment and autarky, as well as the
division of labor.
Specialization entails two diﬀerent kinds of costs. First, the players have a preference
for cooperation or solidarity in the form of a beneﬁt
M = me(eA − eP) + ma(aA − aP) (5)
that satisﬁes the following assumptions.
Assumptions 3. (i) m0
e > 0 when eA < eP, m0
e = 0 when eA = eP, and m0
e < 0 when
eA > eP, (ii) m00
e < 0, and (iii) ma satisﬁes similar assumptions.
The components me and ma in (5) are therefore strictly concave and attain their maxima
when there is full solidarity in the sense that eA = eP and aA = aP, respectively. Each
player shares in half the total beneﬁt as in (6) below.
7 We think of production as an essentially physical activity and administration as mainly cognitive,
so the two are not perfect substitutes as suggested by the disutility of eﬀort. E.g., if ei = E then i’s
physical reserves are completely exhausted and she cannot increase her production eﬀort, although she
may still be able to increase administration eﬀort. From a technical perspective, the constraint set deﬁned
by ei + ai ≤ E is not a lattice, which we need for Proposition 5 below.
10We can interpret this form of solidarity in terms of norms for hard work as in Rob
and Zemsky (2002), where agents choose individual and cooperative eﬀorts and suﬀer a
cost in the form of guilt or shame if the latter falls short of an exogenous ﬁxed target.
In our model, however, the principal chooses her eﬀorts ﬁrst. The targets eP and aP
can therefore be interpreted as endogenous norms chosen by the principal as part of the
(implicit) contract. Alternatively, Marx believed that self-realization could only occur in
society: “only in community with others has each individual the means of cultivating his
gifts in all directions” (Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 197). In that case, a
loss of solidarity implies a lack of self-realization. Whatever the speciﬁc interpretation,
(5) incorporates a basic form of reciprocity where an increase (decrease) in eﬀort by the
principal motivates the agent to increase (decrease) his own eﬀort in the same task.
The other cost associated with specialization is that the players have a preference for
variety in work. This takes the form si(ei − ai) for i, which satisﬁes conditions similar to
those in Assumptions 3. In particular, si is strictly concave and is maximized when ei = ai.
We can interpret Smith’s comments in the previous section in this sense, although they
seem more relevant for factory work. In Marx’s view, uniform work “disturbs the intensity
and ﬂow of man’s animal spirits, which ﬁnd recreation and delight in mere change of
activity” (Marx, Capital I, p. 391). Note that Lindbeck and Snower (1996, 2000) allow a
preference for either specialization or variety in work.
The agent’s utility function is
−exp{−r[I − CA + σsA + (1/2)µM]}, (6)
where r > 0 is the coeﬃcient of absolute risk aversion, I is the agent’s income, σ ≥ 0 the
weight on the preference for diversity in work, and µ ≥ 0 the weight on the preference for
solidarity. The principal is risk neutral and her choice of contract is restricted to the set
of linear compensation rules of the form
I = α + βexe + βaxa, (7)
where α is the ﬁxed component and βe and βa are the commission rates on the signals.8 As
is well-known, linear contracts are generally suboptimal but are assumed for tractability.
8 The classical economists did not think of wage formation solely in terms of perfect competition. As
11For more discussion on this point, see Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991) and Bolton and
Dewatripont (2005). Under these assumptions, the agent’s certainty equivalent is given by





is the agent’s risk premium, which expresses the cost of risk. The only diﬀerences between
(8) and the standard multi-tasking linear model are the two terms related to the agent’s
preferences for solidarity and diversity in work.
We assume the principal can commit to a contract (α,βe,βa,eP,aP) which stipulates
her own production and administration eﬀorts, as well as the lump-sum payment and piece
rates. The timing of the game is as follows. First, the principal decides whether or not
to oﬀer the agent a contract. If not, the principal solves the autarky problem [see (16)]
and the agent receives his outside option U. In classical economics, as well as for Marx
[Kolakowski (2005, p. 114)], U is the subsistence payoﬀ: that which is just necessary for
the worker to maintain himself and successfully reproduce. If the principal does make an
oﬀer, the agent must decide whether or not to accept it. If he accepts, the agent maximizes
(8) subject to (4). Otherwise, he receives U. As usual, the principal chooses α such that
the participation constraint always binds, so the agent always accepts the contract if one
is oﬀered. After the agent solves his problem, the outcome is realized and both players
receive their payoﬀs.
Proposition 1 below is a technical result for the agent’s problem which will play an
important role throughout the paper. All proofs are in the Appendix.




e(−E) > 0 (10)
Archibald (1992) notes, Smith, J.S. Mill, and Marx all discussed the bargaining problem between employers
and employees. In particular, Mill was well aware of the moral hazard problem and advocated piece rates
whenever possible. Likewise, Marx believed that piece rates were cheaper than monitoring and therefore
more suitable for capitalist production [Elster (1986, p. 87, 91)]. None of them, however, considered the
risk-reward tradeoﬀ.
12then eA = 0 at the optimum for all βe ≤ βe. A similar statement holds for βa. (iii) There
exists βe > 0 and βa > 0 such that the principal can achieve any eﬀort allocation by the
agent satisfying (4) by choosing (βe,βa) ∈ [0,βe] × [0,βa].
After stating that a unique solution exists, (10) provides a condition that rules out
cases where the agent would be willing to work without incentives (or even negative ones)
because of his preference for solidarity. Note that (10) requires C0
A(0) to be positive, as
assumed previously, and suﬃciently large. Since the agent will not supply positive eﬀort






in any nontrivial contract. As in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, p. 33), the existence
of a positive quasi-ﬁxed cost for nontrivial employment contracts will have important
implications in what follows. In (iii), we show that the principal’s constraint set can be
restricted without loss of generality to be a compact lattice [see Vives (1999, p. 17)].
We now turn to the comparative statics of the agent’s problem. In Proposition 2
below, we only report results for eA since the results for aA are similar. The proof is a
standard comparative statics exercise and is therefore omitted.






















































13The intuition is straightforward. Given previous assumptions, the agent’s production
eﬀort is increasing in production incentives, but the eﬀect of administration incentives is
ambiguous and depends on the weight σ on the preference for diversity in work. If the
latter is positive and suﬃciently large, then an increase in administration incentives will
increase the agent’s administration eﬀort and therefore his production eﬀort because of the
preference for diversity. The agent’s production eﬀort is also increasing in the principal’s
production eﬀort because of their preference for solidarity. It follows that the principal
can motivate the agent’s production eﬀort through production incentives, the principal’s
own production eﬀort, or some combination of the two. Their relationship can therefore
take the form of a market (incentive-based) relation or a social relation based on solidarity
(although not exclusively by Proposition 1) and the central question of the paper is how the
gains from specialization aﬀect this balance. The eﬀects of the principal’s administration
eﬀort are ambiguous and depend on σ in similar fashion.
If the principal oﬀers the agent a contract, she sets α so the participation constraint
U ≥ U binds. In that case, the agent accepts the contract and the principal’s payoﬀ is
P + γG − CP + σsP + (1/2)µM − I. (14)
Substituting the agent’s participation constraint, the principal’s expected payoﬀ becomes
W = P + γG − CA − CP + σS + µM − R − U, (15)
where S = sA + sP. In the case of autarky, the principal’s payoﬀ is
ˆ W = P(eP,aP) + γG(0,eP − aP) − CP + σsP + (1/2)µ[me(−eP) + ma(−aP)]. (16)
Although the principal can still reap the gains from her own specialization, she also bears
the cost of the lack of solidarity.
We now synthesize two classical ideas. The ﬁrst is that a division of labor leads
to exchange and markets, as expounded by Smith and Marx. The second involves the
classical risk-reward tradeoﬀ from agency theory. As Archibald (1992, p. 72) notes, the
classical economists (including Smith, J.S. Mill, and Marx) were well aware of the moral
hazard problem in agency, although they never considered risk-sharing in that context. In
14contrast, in proposition 2 of Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991) it is the risk associated with
asset ownership that determines whether the agency relationship will be an employment
relationship (zero incentives and the principal owns the asset) or a market one (positive
incentives and the agent owns the asset). After stating in Proposition 3(i) below that a
solution to the principal’s problem exists, (ii) shows that the principal prefers autarky over
employment when R and U are suﬃciently large, which is clear from (15) and (16). Of
course, U does not pose much of a hurdle if it equals the subsistence payoﬀ.9 In (iii), the
principal prefers to hire the agent exclusively for production work when the gains from
specialization are suﬃciently large and administrative performance is suﬃciently hard to
measure.
Proposition 3. (i) A solution to the principal’s problem exists. (ii) The principal prefers
autarky over employment when R and U are suﬃciently large relative to other parameters.
(iii) Given ﬁxed values for all other parameters, and assuming (10), there exists (γ1,V a)
such that for all γ ≥ γ1 and Va ≥ V a the principal prefers to hire the agent with positive
production eﬀort and zero administration eﬀort over autarky. In particular, βe > βe and
βa = 0 at the optimum.
Note that (iii) is stronger than aA → 0 as γ → ∞, which is a statement about what
happens in the limit. Instead, (iii) states that the agent fully specializes in production for
ﬁnite values of γ (the parameter emphasized in classical economics) and Va (emphasized
in modern agency theory). To prove this result, it seems we need both γ and Va to be large
(see the proof).
If we take the hypotheses in Proposition 3 as our starting-point, Proposition 4(i) shows
that as γ → ∞ each player fully specializes in their own separate task. In that case, there
is a complete division of labor and the absence of any solidarity or diversity in work. The
limiting case is therefore the market equilibrium, where there is ‘no other nexus between
man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment.”’ 4(ii) is an important
9 From a historical perspective, Marx argued that the enclosure movement in England from the sixteenth
through the eighteenth centuries was deliberately intended to force the small peasants from the land so
that they would be available for capitalist production [Elster (1986, p. 82-3)]. In terms of the model, the
principal could create the necessary conditions for proﬁtable employment by reducing U.
15ingredient in the proof of Proposition 5.
Proposition 4. Assume (10), γ ≥ γ1, and Va ≥ V a. (i) As γ → ∞, aP
γ → E. (ii) In
particular, there exists γ2 ≥ γ1 such that aP
γ > eP
γ for all γ ≥ γ2.
We now turn to the comparative statics of the principal’s problem. To derive these,
we would like to use lattice programming methods [e.g., see Vives (1999, Chapter 2)] since
the problem is too complicated for standard techniques. Unfortunately, the surface deﬁned
by the incentive compatibility constraint is not generally a compact lattice, so our strategy
will be to assume the following functional forms:
Ci(ei + ai) = (1/2)(ei + ai)2 + c(ei + ai)
M = −(eA − eP)2 − (aA − aP)2 + 1
si(ei − ai) = −(1/2)(ei − ai)2 + 1, (17)
where i = A,P and c > 0. It is easy to verify that c − E(µ + σ) > 0 implies (10), so
all our previous assumptions hold. Given these functional forms, we can explicitly solve
the agent’s maximization problem in (8) and then substitute into the principal’s objective
function (15). After eliminating the incentive compatibility constraint in this way, the
principal’s problem becomes a standard lattice program.
To state Proposition 5, we recall some terminology. A twice-diﬀerentiable function is
supermodular if all of its cross-partial derivatives are nonnegative. This concept therefore
captures the notion of complementarities between variables. Given two vectors x and y,
we write x ≥ y if xj ≥ yj for each component. In general, the set of maximizers for a
supermodular function has a largest and smallest element [see Vives (1999, p. 30)], which
we refer to as the extremal optima. Given the usual ordering ≥ on the real line, we deﬁne
the reverse ordering ≥0 as follows: x ≥0 y iﬀ y ≥ x. In what follows, we assume an upper
bound γ on the magnitude of the gains from specialization.
Proposition 5. Assume the hypotheses of Proposition 4 and the functional forms in (17).
Furthermore, assume σ < 1 and
P12 − γG22 < 0 (18)
16on the interval [γ2,γ]. (i) If µ = 0 (or is suﬃciently close) then the principal’s objective
function (15) is supermodular in (βe,eP,aP,γ) with the reverse ordering for eP. (ii) In
that case, the extremal optima are monotonically increasing in γ given the reverse ordering
for eP. In particular, if the principal’s problem has a unique solution then βe and aP are
increasing in γ, while eP is decreasing in γ.
The ﬁrst result 5(i) reveals the basic structure of the paper. In Propositions 3 and
4, we showed that eA > 0, aA = 0, and aP > eP when γ ≥ γ2 and Va ≥ V a and in 5(i)
we show that the principal’s objective function is supermodular (with the reverse ordering
for eP) under those conditions, along with some others. In 5(ii), we show that as γ → ∞
starting from the situation in Proposition 4, the extremal optima for incentives and the
principal’s administration eﬀort increase. If the principal’s problem has multiple solutions,
then we have monotone comparative statics in the sense that the intervals containing the
optimal values for those variables shift up. At the same time, the extremal optima for
the principal’s production eﬀort decrease. In the case of uniqueness, we obtain monotone
comparative statics in the usual sense.
The intuition is as follows. Since the principal is already doing more administration
than production, she will only be willing to re-allocate her eﬀort out of production and
into administration if her preference for variety in work is suﬃciently weak, which explains
the condition σ < 1. Furthermore, (18) states that the corresponding loss in terms of
production complementarity P12
10 is more than oﬀset by the corresponding gain G22 from
increased specialization in administration. With respect to incentives, σ < 1 again implies
the agent has little interest in diversity in work, so he is willing to increase his production
eﬀort. Furthermore, the degrees of specialization of the players are complements (see
Assumptions 1), so the principal will want the agent to increase his production eﬀort as
she increasingly specializes in administration. Since she cannot motivate the agent by
increasing her own production eﬀort, she must increase incentives. As a result, the players
increasingly specialize in their own separate tasks and market relations gradually replace
10 If two variables are complements, then an increase in one raises the marginal beneﬁt of increasing
the other. As a result, optimality generally requires complementary variables to be set at comparable
levels, but in this case the principal is creating an increasing imbalance between her administration and
production eﬀorts.
17social ones. Of course, this could never be eﬃcient if µ were suﬃciently large. In the limit,
we obtain the market equilibrium where, in eﬀect, the principal regards the agent as merely
a factor of production and the agent views the principal as an “abstract money-power.”
From now on, we revert to the general expressions for Ci, M, and si, since we only
need the explicit functional forms in (17) for Proposition 5. In the full information context,
the principal can observe the agent’s eﬀorts and can use forcing contracts to achieve any
eﬀort allocation (eA,aA) she desires, subject only to the participation constraint and (4).
A ﬁrst best solution therefore solves the problem
max
eA,aA,eP,aP P + γG − CA − CP + σS + µM − U (19)
subject to (4).
We now deﬁne the concepts of solidarity allocation and solidarity equilibrium.
Deﬁnitions 1. (i) A solidarity allocation is a ﬁrst best solution to the problem in (19)
where all eﬀorts are equal eA = aA = eP = aP. (ii) A solidarity equilibrium is an optimal
linear contract such that α implies both players receive half the total surplus, βe = βa = 0,
and the allocation of eﬀorts is a solidarity allocation.
In this deﬁnition, we follow a tradition extending back to Lange and Lerner in our
insistence that the solidarity equilibrium entail a ﬁrst best allocation of eﬀorts. Since
these eﬀorts are all equal, it is characterized by full solidarity and full diversity in work
(no division of labor). Furthermore, in keeping with its cooperative nature, it cannot be
implemented using forcing contracts or incentives and can only be supported by reciprocity.
Finally, it requires an equal division of the surplus, which is (19) plus U. Up to this point,
we have considered reciprocity solely in terms of work eﬀort, but we now also insist on
reciprocity with respect to payoﬀs. The solidarity equilibrium is therefore the complete
opposite of the market equilibrium.
Although Marx depicted the division of labor as an “objective power above us, growing
out of our control” (see the previous section), in our model we cannot think of it in terms
of the prisoner’s dilemma. Indeed, as γ → ∞ in Proposition 5, the agent’s payoﬀ is ﬁxed
at U whereas it is clear that eventually the principal is increasingly better oﬀ. There
18is, however, another way in which capitalism can be thought of as a prisoner’s dilemma
which is consistent both with Marx’s views and elementary contract theory. Suppose the
principal were to oﬀer a solidarity contract as in Deﬁnitions 1(ii). In principle, the agent
could accept this contract and supply eA = aA = eP = aP. Although the outcome would
be the solidarity equilibrium, it is not really an equilibrium because it is not incentive
compatible: according to Proposition 1 the agent will shirk. Instead, both players “defect”
and play their second best equilibrium strategies.
How, then, can the solidarity equilibrium be achieved? An important element of
Marx’s critique of capitalism is that man’s social relations are determined by material
forces – the production technology and the division of labor – and that the abolition of the
latter will require (i) a development in the production technology that renders the division
of labor obsolete and (ii) a fundamental change in human nature, such that the private
and public interest coincide. In particular, we note the extreme contrast between labor
in communism, which is the “life of the species,” and its counterpart in capitalism, which
provides no self-fulﬁllment and therefore “as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists,
labor is shunned like the plague” (Marx, The 1844 Manuscripts, p. 74). In other words, the
agent derives disutility from eﬀort only in capitalism and the transition from capitalism
to communism will necessarily involve a fundamental shift in the agent’s attitude towards
work. We now sketch a formal mechanism for achieving the solidarity equilibrium which
is not only broadly consistent with Marx’s views, but also with Elster’s (1986, p. 159-66)
characterization of them as “massively utopian.”
The mechanism is as follows. First, the principal oﬀers the solidarity contract in
Deﬁnitions 1(ii). As things now stand, the agent will shirk. Assume, however, that the
agent interprets the principal’s oﬀer as an act of solidarity and reciprocates by adopting the
new disutility of eﬀort ˆ CA deﬁned in Proposition 6 below. In essence, this idea is similar
to that in Casadesus-Masanell (2004), who shows that it is in the agent’s best interest
to develop intrinsic motivation in the form of norms, ethical standards, or altruism. The
speciﬁc form of ˆ CA is taken from Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom (1991, p. 34), in their analysis
of low-powered incentives in ﬁrms. In our model, the agent’s reciprocity is represented by
ˆ CA, which implies that he derives positive utility from supplying his ﬁrst best eﬀort levels
19because he is participating in the cooperative establishment of the solidarity equilibrium
and his eﬀorts are therefore an act of self-realization. This is the ﬁrst utopian element
in our mechanism for the achievement of the solidarity equilibrium: it is assumed the
prisoner’s dilemma can be overcome through reciprocity. As discussed in the previous
section, Marx’s deﬁnition of freedom is essentially the coordinated decision to cooperate in
prisoner’s dilemmas, as opposed to the classical notion of freedom that leads to defection.
It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize the utopian nature of this mechanism
since, as Fehr and Fischbacher (2002, p. C14) point out, cooperation rates are frequently
between 40-60% in one-shot prisoner’s dilemmas.
Proposition 6. Let t = eA + aA be the total eﬀort required of the agent in some ﬁxed
solidarity allocation. If the agent adopts the new disutility of eﬀort ˆ CA, where ˆ C0
A(x) < 0
when x < t, ˆ C0
A(t) = 0, and ˆ C0
A(x) > 0 when x > t, then the agent will supply his ﬁrst
best eﬀort levels eA = aA = t/2 if he accepts the solidarity contract.
We motivate our next assumption based on experimental evidence from the ultimatum
game, where one player (the proposer) oﬀers another player (the responder) some amount
p of a ﬁxed surplus normalized to one. If the responder accepts, she receives a payoﬀ of p
and the proposer receives 1−p. If the responder rejects, then both receive zero. A stylized
fact from experiments with this game [see Sobel (2005, p. 397-8)] is that low proposals are
rare and usually rejected, while equal or nearly equal splits occur more than 50% of the
time. These ﬁndings are inconsistent with purely selﬁsh preferences.
If we assume the agent rejects all oﬀers where he receives less than half of the associated
surplus, and make the reasonable assumption that half of the solidarity surplus exceeds
the principal’s autarky payoﬀ, as well as U, then the solidarity equilibrium is the unique
subgame perfect equilibrium. If no oﬀer is made, or if one is made where the agent receives
less than half of the surplus, then the principal receives her autarky payoﬀ and the agent
receives U. Of all those contracts the agent would accept, the principal clearly prefers the
solidarity equilibrium because she receives half of the ﬁrst best surplus computed using ˆ CA
(which is better than the ﬁrst and second best with CA). In all other acceptable contracts,
the agent uses CA to determine his second best eﬀorts, but in the speciﬁc case of the
20solidarity contract he uses ˆ CA because he regards such an oﬀer as an act of solidarity.
In the previous argument, we implicitly assumed a unique solidarity equilibrium. We
now show that this is indeed the case under reasonable assumptions, where the unique
solidarity equilibrium involves all eﬀorts at their maximum feasible level E.
Proposition 7. Assume P is symmetric11 and strictly concave, γ is suﬃciently small that
P + γG is strictly concave, the agent’s disutility of eﬀort is ˆ CA as in Proposition 6, and
me ≡ ma. If
P1(2E,2E) + P2(2E,2E) − 2C0
P(2E) ≥ 0 (20)
then the unique ﬁrst best is the solidarity equilibrium where eA = aA = eP = aP = E.
The intuition is straightforward. Given that the agent is prepared to adopt any ˆ CA,
it is optimal for him to adopt the one where he supplies maximum feasible eﬀort in both
tasks. In order for the principal to match these eﬀorts, however, the production technology
must entail suﬃciently large marginal products P1 and P2 so as to dominate the gains
from specialization. This is the second utopian element in Marx’s thought – a suﬃciently
advanced production technology – which is reminiscent of Elster’s characterization in terms
of a “scarcity-free utopia.”12
We cannot, however, completely dismiss these ideas. Indeed, a less extreme version
of the solidarity equilibrium is a frequent outcome of experiments in agency settings. In
particular, Fehr and G¨ achter (2001) found that experimental subjects in the role of agents
supplied an average eﬀort level of 0.37 on a scale of 0 to 1 in their “trust treatment”
where principals could only oﬀer ﬁxed payments like α in our model. In contrast, in the
“incentive treatment” the average eﬀort level was 0.27 which is lower in a statistically
signiﬁcant sense. The authors explain this diﬀerence in terms of incentives “crowding-out”
the agents’ reciprocity. In similar experiments, Fehr, Klein, and Schmidt (2001, 2007)
found that subjects acting as principals chose implicit contracts based on reciprocity over
explicit incentive contracts 88% of the time, which suggests that solidarity may well be a
11 I.e., P(x,y) = P(y,x) for all x and y.
12 An even more utopian mechanism would involve a similar ˆ CP for the principal, or even eliminating
CA and CP altogether. In this paper, however, we are attempting to identify the least utopian mechanism.
21viable mechanism when implemented in small groups. Finally, Lindbeck and Snower (1996,
2000) document several fundamental changes that have occurred in production technologies
over the last two decades that increasingly favor integrated tasks and a reduction in the
degree of specialization.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we developed a version of the linear agency model in Holmstr¨ om and Milgrom
(1991) with two tasks, production and administration, where performance is harder to
measure in the latter. Both the principal and the agent can devote eﬀort to these tasks.
In addition, the model incorporates: (i) the gains from specialization – output is higher
when the players specialize in separate tasks; (ii) social preferences – their choice of eﬀorts
is governed at least in part by norms, or the players have a preference for cooperation and
solidarity; and (iii) a preference for diversity in work.
We showed that as the gains from specialization increase, eventually the principal
prefers to hire the agent over autarky. In that case, the agent specializes in production
because he is risk averse and performance in the production task is relatively easy to
measure. Since the agent has a preference for solidarity, his production eﬀort can be
motivated either by the principal’s production eﬀort or incentives. As the gains from
specialization increase further, the principal re-allocates her eﬀort out of production and
into administration. At the same time, she increases incentives to compensate for the
agent’s weakened motivation due to the loss of solidarity. In the limit, we obtain the market
equilibrium where there is a complete division of labor, an absence of solidarity, and the
agent is motivated solely by incentives. In a nutshell, a division of labor leads to exchange
and a deterioration in social relations. These results hold when the players’ preferences for
solidarity and diversity in work are suﬃciently weak and there are complementarities in
production and specialization. In contrast with Sobel (2007), who shows that reciprocal
types generally appear selﬁsh in markets, we have shown that selﬁsh types generally prefer
to transact in markets. Finally, we showed that the solidarity equilibrium can be achieved
when the agent derives positive utility from supplying his ﬁrst best eﬀort levels and the
production technology exhibits high marginal products.
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Proof of Proposition 1
To prove (i), we note that a solution exists because all the functions in (8) are continuous
on the agent’s compact constraint set deﬁned by (4). Since D > 0, U has a negative
deﬁnite Hessian and is therefore strictly concave, so uniqueness follows. To prove (ii),








Since the agent’s ﬁrst-order conditions are necessary and suﬃcient, the corner solution
eA∗ = 0 obtains iﬀ
U∗
eA = βe − C0
A(aA∗) + σs0
A(−aA∗) + (1/2)µm0
e(−eP) ≤ 0. (A.2)









We now prove (iii). Given uniqueness, the Maximum Theorem in Aliprantis and Border
(1999, p. 539) implies eA∗ and aA∗ are continuous. If βe = βa = 0 then eA∗ = aA∗ = 0.
It is clear from (A.1) that there exists βe > 0 such that eA∗ = E when βe = βe and
likewise for βa > 0. Now, [0,βe]×[0,βa] is path-connected and the continuous image of a
path-connected set is path-connected. Since the principal can achieve all 4 corners of the
agent’s square constraint set using (0,0), (βe,0), (0,βa), and (βe,βa), she can achieve the
entire set.
Proof of Proposition 3
We ﬁrst prove (i). If the principal oﬀers a contract, her expected payoﬀ is (15) after
substituting eA∗ and aA∗. Since the latter are continuous, (15) with substitutions and (16)
23are both continuous. The principal’s eﬀorts are constrained by the compact sets deﬁned in
(4) and incentives by [0,βe]×[0,βa], so a solution exists for both maximization problems.
Since (ii) is obvious, we proceed to (iii). Suppose not. Then there exists a sequence
{(γn,V n
a )} such that γn → ∞, V n






a > βa > 0 or autarky. Note that we omit the agent’s eﬀorts from the
sequence of optima since they have already been substituted into (15). Let (ˆ eP
n,ˆ aP
n) denote
the principal’s autarkic eﬀort levels that maximize (16). We ﬁrst focus on the subsequence
corresponding to autarky and consider the following alternative: for all n ≥ 1, the principal
chooses her autarkic eﬀort levels, βe = βe, and βa = 0, so eA = E and aA = 0. The
diﬀerence between the principal’s payoﬀ evaluated at the alternative and at the optimum
is
P(E + ˆ eP
n,ˆ aP





n − ˆ aP
n) − G(0, ˆ eP
n − ˆ aP
n)

− CA(E) + σsA(E)
+ µ

me(E − ˆ eP





eVe − U. (A.4)
Since all functions are continuous and all eﬀorts are bounded, all the terms in (A.4) are
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Since the term in square brackets is strictly positive, the alternative is preferred for n large





















the agent’s optimal eﬀorts along the sequence of optima. Omitting all ﬁxed and bounded










24Since the term in square brackets is nonnegative and
(1/2)r(βn
a)2V n
a ≥ (1/2)r(βa)2V n
a → ∞, (A.8)
we have a contradiction for n suﬃciently large. Note that we cannot claim the term in
square brackets in (A.7) is strictly positive, so it appears we need both γn → ∞ and
V n
a → ∞ for the result.
Proof of Proposition 4
Since γ ≥ γ1 and Va ≥ V a, the principal hires the agent exclusively for production purposes
by Proposition 3, where βe > βe and βa = 0. Let γ → ∞ and (βγ
e,eP
γ ,aP
γ ) be the associated
optima. Consider the alternative βe = βe and |eP − aP| = E, so the principal completely
specializes in a single task to be determined. After omitting all ﬁxed and bounded terms,






γ is the agent’s optimal eﬀort. Note that (A.9) uses Assumption 1(iv). Since G is
maximized at (E,E), we must have |eP
γ −aP
γ | → E and eA
γ → E. In the limit, the principal
must completely specialize in a single task. Since P2(·,0) = ∞, we must have aP
γ → E.
Proof of Proposition 5
Since γ ≥ γ2 and Va ≥ V a, we have βa = 0 and aA = 0 from Proposition 3 and eP∗ < aP∗
from Proposition 4. Given the functional forms in (17), we have
eA∗ =
βe − c + µeP
1 + µ + σ
. (A.10)
We then substitute (A.10) and (17) into (15) to obtain the principal’s objective function.
Note that the constraints for the principal’s maximization problem 0 ≤ βe ≤ βe, 0 ≤ eP ≤
E, and 0 ≤ aP ≤ E form a compact cube and hence a compact lattice. The cross-partial
derivatives of the principal’s objective function are
WeP,aP = (σ − 1) + (P12 − γG22) +
µ
1 + µ + σ
(P12 − γG12) < 0
25WeP,βe =
µ(1 + σ) + (1 + µ + σ)(P11 + γG12) + µ(P11 + γG11)
(1 + µ + σ)2 < 0
WaP,βe =
P12 − γG12
1 + µ + σ
> 0
WeP,γ = G2 +
µG1
1 + µ + σ
< 0
WaP,γ = −G2 > 0
Wβe,γ =
G1
1 + µ + σ
> 0. (A.11)
Since σ < 1, (18) holds, µ = 0 (or suﬃciently close), G12 < 0, G2 < 0, and G1 > 0, we
have the above inequalities. If we take the reverse ordering for eP, all these inequalities
are positive, and we can apply theorem 2.4 and its corollary in Vives (1999, p. 30) to
complete the proof.
Proof of Proposition 6
Assume the principal oﬀers a contract where βe = βa = 0 and eP = aP = t/2 > 0 and the
agent’s disutility of eﬀort is ˆ CA. A monotonic transformation of (6) gives
α − ˆ CA + σsA + (1/2)µM. (A.12)









These expressions vanish at eA = aA = t/2, so the agent’s ﬁrst-order conditions (interior
or corner) are satisﬁed. Since the agent’s objective function with ˆ CA is strictly concave,
we are done.
26Proof of Proposition 7
We ﬁrst consider the problem
max
eA,eP,aA,aP P + γG + σS + µM (A.14)
subject to (4) and constraints eA + aA = tA and eP + aP = tP on the total eﬀort of each
player. Substituting aA = tA − eA and aP = tP − eP into (A.14), we obtain a problem
involving only eA and eP. The partial derivative with respect to eA is




After substituting eA = aA = tA/2 and eP = aP = tP/2 into (A.15), we obtain















where T = tA + tP. This follows because me ≡ ma and P is symmetric, so P1 − P2 = 0
when all arguments are equal. Likewise, the proposed solution also satisﬁes the ﬁrst-order
condition for eP. Since (A.14) is strictly concave, it is therefore the unique optimum: given
ﬁxed total time endowments, the players should split their time equally between the two
activities. Now consider the problem
max












subject to the constraints 0 ≤ tA/2 ≤ E and 0 ≤ tP/2 ≤ E. The partial derivative of
(A.17) with respect to tA is




A solidarity allocation requires tA = tP = t. After substituting this into (A.18) and using
ˆ C0
A(t) = 0, we obtain (1/2)(P1 + P2) > 0. It follows that the only solidarity allocation
27that can possibly solve the problem is the corner solution t = 2E. The partial derivative
of (A.17) with respect to tP is




After substituting tA = tP = 2E, we ﬁnd that this is nonnegative iﬀ (20) holds. In that
case, the unique ﬁrst best solution is the corner solidarity allocation.
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